But reading the offer simply as a de-escalation initiative misses what is most dangerous about it. In reality, it is an attempt to turn leverage Iran itself created into a bargaining chip to be sold at the highest possible price. And Tehran wants part of that price paid in Yemen.
The heart of the plan: Controlled reopening
As presented by Araghchi, the plan calls for a seven-day cessation of hostilities across the region, including Lebanon; the release of at least $12bn in frozen Iranian assets; the lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil; and an end to the US naval blockade. In return, the Strait of Hormuz would reopen through a new route determined by Iran and Oman.
That final detail alone is enough to show what Tehran is seeking. It is not a return to the way the strait operated before the war, but the establishment of a new reality in which international shipping becomes conditional on an arrangement set by Iran.
There is little need for inference here. Iran already requires ships to obtain prior authorisation before passing through, while vessels that refuse are targeted.
And when Tehran takes its proposal to Beijing in search of Chinese backing and secures support from Oman, it is building a regional political framework around this new reality that would make it much harder to reverse later.
A bet on US political calendar
The picture becomes clearer still when the timing is considered. Tehran has made no secret of the fact that it is watching the US political calendar, openly signalling that it would prefer to reach an agreement before the midterm elections, at a moment when rising energy prices are putting pressure on both American consumers and the administration.
The calculation is straightforward: Iran knows that the cost of keeping the strait closed rises for its opponent as the November elections approach, so it is offering a solution at the moment when that solution is at its most valuable.
The most dangerous element of the offer, however, is the inclusion of Yemen in the bargain. Hossein Mohebbi, a spokesperson for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who oversees Iran’s Yemen portfolio, told the AFP news agency that ending hostilities in Yemen was among Tehran’s demands.
Notably, this new condition was announced by the IRGC and may not appear in the plan presented by Araghchi. It remains unclear whether the formal proposal includes the renewed conflict in Yemen.
This discrepancy should not be read as confusion, but as a familiar division of roles in Iranian policy: one side publicly raises the ceiling of demands, while another keeps the negotiating document flexible enough to allow room to advance or retreat.
Some reports go further. They say, one day before announcing his seven-day plan, Araghchi gave US envoys a written document setting out a roadmap for a region-wide ceasefire lasting up to 60 days, alongside a gradual reopening of the strait and an end to the US naval blockade.
According to published accounts of the document, Tehran is demanding the release of about $24bn in frozen Iranian funds and a halt to enforcement of the blockade imposed on the Houthis as a precondition for any comprehensive settlement.
If these reports are accurate, Tehran presented two documents within two days: one offering a rapid arrangement for Hormuz, and another setting out a broader framework that explicitly incorporates Yemen. That would suggest Iran is negotiating on more than one level at once: offering the world what appears to be an immediate way out of the energy crisis while placing the real price it wants to extract in the broader document.
The 60-day track: MoU and missing document
The 60-day track is thought to refer not to a new document from Araghchi, but to the framework of the memorandum of understanding signed remotely by Presidents Donald Trump and Masoud Pezeshkian on June 17, which was intended to consolidate the ceasefire and reach a final agreement within 60 days.
Washington has signalled that it considers the MoU to have run its course, while Trump has declared the ceasefire over. His administration has treated the memorandum as an agreement Iran violated and one that has therefore lost its political basis. Araghchi, meanwhile, is now publicly calling for a return to that understanding and has welcomed China’s efforts to revive it.
If the seven-day plan is merely an entry point for restarting the 60-day process, then Trump’s refusal to lift the blockade effectively amounts to rejecting the entire track at this stage, even if he has not formally rejected a specific document.
However, no open source appears to have reported the existence of a separate written document handed over by Araghchi containing a 60-day regional roadmap. The claim could therefore stem either from a leak that has not been widely published or from media confusion.
In any case, Washington is refusing to accept Tehran’s conditions over Hormuz. The US administration has said it will not return to the terms of the June MoU, while one official indicated that Washington was in no hurry given its advantage in the strait.
The Wall Street Journal has also reported that Trump rejected an Iranian offer conveyed through intermediaries under which Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and resume talks over its nuclear programme in exchange for an end to the US naval blockade of Iranian ports.
The newspaper cited officials familiar with the matter as saying Washington had informed Tehran and the mediators that it had no plans to lift the blockade.
What Iran is bargaining for
The danger in Iran’s manoeuvre lies in the fact that, under these conditions, Tehran is not so much bargaining over reopening the strait as over effective control of it.
Hormuz is an international waterway where, for centuries, navigation has rested on the right of transit passage for civilian and military vessels, including submarines, as well as aircraft, without requiring anyone’s prior permission. A route determined by two coastal states and made conditional on advance authorisation would transform the strait from an international space into a managed corridor whose operators could decide when to open or close it and which vessels would be permitted to pass.
If such an arrangement is accepted today under pressure from high energy prices, it could become the basis for any later settlement. The discussion would no longer be about freedom of navigation, but about the terms under which permission to navigate is granted.
The sequence of the proposal adds to the danger. All the gains sought by Iran come first, from the payment of funds to the lifting of sanctions and the end of the blockade, while the nuclear file is postponed until after the strait is reopened.
Washington is therefore being asked to pay the full price in return for a fragile promise to negotiate over the nuclear issue that triggered the war in the first place. The strait, once reopened, could be closed again at any time, while sanctions that have been lifted and money that has been transferred cannot easily be recovered.
The strategic pincer: Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb
The danger becomes greatest when Iran’s conditions over Hormuz and Yemen are considered together rather than separately.
Tehran speaks of allowing passage for those it considers “non-hostile” in Hormuz, while the Houthis say they target no one in the Red Sea except Saudi Arabia. The same doctrine applies in both waterways: navigation is treated not as a universal right, but as a privilege granted according to political position.
More importantly, Saudi Arabia’s main alternative for bypassing Hormuz is to transport its oil overland to Red Sea ports. But that alternative then passes through Bab al-Mandeb, which the Houthis are moving closer to.
Iranian pressure in Hormuz and Houthi pressure in the Red Sea therefore do not operate as two separate fronts. They form a single pincer: one closes the primary outlet while the other threatens the alternative.
Seen in this light, incorporating Yemen into a Hormuz deal is not simply another item on Iran’s list of demands. It completes a wider Iranian equation: whoever controls both waterways controls the Gulf’s entire lifeline.
A dangerous precedent: Rewarding disruption
The precedent that would be entrenched if such a bargain went through is more dangerous than any single element of it: that closing vital arteries of international trade can be rewarded with the release of frozen assets, the lifting of blockades and sanctions, and the consolidation of influence.
Avoiding that precedent requires a firm position, not a rejection of negotiations altogether, but strategic patience aimed at denying Iran the gains it is seeking at the expense of international law and regional security.
The region and the wider world have a stake in debating such a deal, because what is accepted in Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb will not remain confined to those two waterways. It would become a precedent invoked in future disputes over strategic maritime chokepoints around the world.
If Iran emerges from this war with a strait it effectively controls, frozen funds restored to it and restrictions lifted from its Yemeni ally, the lesson for every aspiring regional power will be that disrupting international trade is the quickest route to the negotiating table and the most profitable way to leave it.
The result would be catastrophic for the world as a whole. Nor would Gulf states be the only ones to pay the price of this lesson. Every country whose economy depends on the Red Sea and the Gulf would bear part of the cost, from Egypt, whose canal depends on the security of Bab al-Mandeb, to Asian and European economies dependent on energy flows.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance. %!s()
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